Colonial Politics of Security Arrangements

Ota thinks that the main reason that Okinawa bears a disproportionate burden of the US' military presence in Japan is because mainland Japanese politicians do not think of Okinawa as wholly Japanese or as first-class citizens. He also says that the Japanese government refuses to listen to the citizens of Okinawa, who have signed petition after petition asking for the US military's presense to be reduced or at least made proportionate to the military presense on mainland Japan. Also, if Okinawa is not under-represented in the Diet, not enough representatives believe that Okinawa needs help and they refuse to form coalitions to help Okinawa. They also do not want to back anything that will take US bases from Okinawa and put them in their own backyard.

The main reason that the US military refuses to decrease their military is because Okinawa is a strategic location that serves both Asia and the Middle East. Also, the US military can do basically whatever it wants without too many repercussions because of several treaties signed with the US and Japan. Ota is frustrated because the US military acts without much thought to the Okinawan citizens, much like a dictator, and the US, of all places, should be championing democracy. But instead the US leaders just ignore all of the Okinawans attempts as solving anything democratically. This hypocracy is central to the issue of US bases on Okinawa and cannot be easily ameliorated.

Japan- McCormack

I think that it is possible for Japan to be both dependent and assertive, it just is not quite the easiest combination to achieve. One of the main things that McCormack stresses is that Japan's current political situation was basically mandated by the US after WWII, with some help from the Japanese Emperor . He also mentions how much the current Japanese government is willing to cooperate with Bush, regardless of whether or not that cooperation is reciprocated or approved of by the Japanese people. Because Japan's "American-imposed" identity has only been established in the latter half of the 20th century, it is difficult for Japan to become part of a greater "Asian" identity. Because Japan is dependent on the US but has an undercurrent in its identity of strength and aggression, it is hard to find a midpoint between dependence and assertion. It seems like Japan is able to be dependent on the US for some things/aspects, like the military, but is assertive in other aspects, like economics. Therefore, Japan will end up being assertive in non-security aspects without being assertive in security aspects. This non-assertion in security aspects will be hard to mesh with the Japanese identity that the Japanese government put forth, but it will be interesting to see how much Japan will continue to be dependent on the US for security if the Japanese identity is strengthened. The dependence-assertion combination is possible, but the emphasis depends on whether or not the government wants to focus on security or on more domestic issues. That give-and-take is constantly changing, so it is possible to achieve a mix of the two and still be a powerful state.

Getting Beyond the Impasse

Kim and Feffer's article is very critical of the Bush administration's handling of the North Korea situation. They feel that the administration is hypocritical in their polices and that they still try to skirt around the issue rather than seek a solution, even with the Six Party Talks. They explain how North Korea is very reluctant to make any concessions until they get some kind of guarantee that they will get something in return, so far the US and Japan have been hesistant to change their policies towards North Korea.

Klinger defends the Bush administration (and South Korea's) by saying that there needs to be some type of North Korean accountibility before any of the polices laid out in the Six Party Talks be implemented. He thinks that the new South Korean president Lee will be a better player than the former South Korea president Roh because Lee will run the country like a business and not be as unfocused in his dealings with North Korea as Roh was.

I think that Kim and Feffer make a better argument, they don't "sugar-coat" the situation as much as the Bush Administration does. I think that the way they talk about North Korea seems more logical and realistic than Klinger's. It takes into account other reasons why North Korea is acting the way they're acting.

Nuclear Chess in North Korea

While watching the documentary, one of the main things that struck me was how basically irresponsible Bush's policy towards North Korea nuclear proliferation really is. That is especially obvious because it seemed like Clinton'sadministration was fairly close to getting Kim to vow not to make bombs; it is faintly ridiculous and childish that Bush stopped talks and refuses to negotiate with North Korea because he "doesn't trust" Kim, I think there are a lot of people in decision-making positions that aren't entirely trustworthy but that doesn't mean that you refuse to try to negotiate with them. I forget who said it (maybe Albright or the other woman), but they said that it is extremely hard to solve anything if the administration has said that giving anything to North Korea is "appeasement"- part of negotiating is compromising somehow. That stance makes it impossible to accomplish anything, which is not in the interests of either the US or North Korea.

I do understand the problem that some people had with Clinton's policy of "appeasement", though, because the "appeasement" money did not really help the North Korean people, it just help the military and Kim. Clinton's policy also was "paying the North Koreans to not do anything dangerous", as one of the interviewees put it, which isn't the best way to solve the problems with North Korean relations. But nothing will get difinitively solved while the current balance of power remains as it is.

Grassroots challenges to military power

The traditional way of looking at players in international security relations often ignores or leaves out many players. This leads to an underestimation of power in the study of international relations which then leads to traditional policy analysts being "suprised" when the player they ignored shifts the policy outcome. An example of this is how the villagers in Daechuri have protested to save their farms/village from the expansion of US Camp Humphreys. Even though the villagers did end up leaving their homes, they got more compensation money and land and caused enough noise and attention to get the government (both South Korea and the US) to take another look at their expansion plans. International relations analysts who only look at major players within governments and ignore small, often politically invisible groups were suprised to see how a small village of farmers were able to find enough of a voice to eventualy be heard.

Power "on the margins" should not be ignored. Of course, there are groups of people who do not really care about how their country is interacting with other countries because those interactions do not effect them. But once a government or group tries to exploit or disturb the marginalized group, the marginalized group will react to try to save their way of life. When that happens, the marginalized group gets the attention of the group in power and usually (hopefully) saves their way of life from destruction. It is dangerous for the groups in power to continuously marginalize other groups becasue once one group is marginalized, its easier to rationalize marginalizing another group and another, and eventually the group in power has created enough marginalized groups to band together and take back power. Disenfranchizing groups and ingoring others makes it difficult to get the full understanding of the issues and factors that build international security relations, and underestimating even one factor can lead to very unfortunate and dangerous circumstances. But very country ignores some groups, so it is diffucult to ever fully understand the motives behind foreign relations.

Moon- "Sex Among Allies"

Moon's thesis is that these women were "instruments of promotion of two governments' bilateral security interests." This is a different way to think about the issue of security, because most interpretations focus on broader, more systemic, relations than those of individuals. But I think it is now important, in our more globalized world, that we do think about the relations between every combination of people, instituitions and governments. The fact that the camp women were a major piece of the interaction between the soldiers and the South Korean citizens is something that can't really be explained by the normal modes of discussion about security, but their interaction has become so entwined that it can't be left out when the South Korea-US relations are being analyzed.

{Prostitution as a symbol of US domination over South Korea in a neo-colonial status. Women's relationships with foreign soldiers personifies and defines the relationship between the governments. Moon}

US Military In Korea

Haselden's main argument is that Korea's reunification would change the current Northeast Asia security/military situation, with Korea, the US, Japan, China, and Russia. He also discusses how the combination of strong economies and strong militaries of East Asia would make the security situation around Korea unstable if US troop withdrawal created a power vacuum. Unified Korea would not be strong enough on its own to change the power structure in the absence of US troops, but if Korea sided with either Japan or China the regional security structure would change. Given how South (and North) Korea views China and Japan, they could potentially side with either country: South Korea has some distrust of Japan but a more working relationship with China and North Korea sides with its "Communist brother" China. Haselden says that the Koreas would resemble South Korea once unified because of the very obvious failure of North Korea, but he doesn't say whether Korea would side with Japan or China. He does say that "Korea's long mutual border, increased economic and political ties, and historical bond with China may lead to a stronger relationship with China, rather than Japan." (pg. 3).

I still am not entirely sure why South Korea would want reunification. I understand the concepts of Pan-Korean nationalism and anti-Great Power-ism, and even how the generation gaps plays into the equation but I'm not sure if all those factors add up to more than economic forces. North Korea's economy is so awful and South Korea's is quite good, so it seems to me like South Korea would be sacrificing prosperity and growth for cultural unity. I think I need to look more into this issue, maybe even do my paper on South Korea somehow, because I want to understand the culture/economy pieces of the Korean reunification issue.